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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL?: THE EIGHTH 
CIRCUIT ALLOWS UNCOUNSELED TRIBAL 
COURT CONVICTIONS TO SATISFY 
ELEMENTS OF FEDERAL OFFENSES 
Melissa Dess* 
Abstract: On July 6, 2011, in United States v. Cavanaugh, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that prior, uncounseled tribal court 
convictions could be used to establish an element of a subsequent federal 
offense. In so doing, the court deemphasized the importance of reliability 
concerns in determining the validity of uncounseled convictions. 
Introduction 
 Roman Cavanaugh, Jr. was charged with the federal offense of 
domestic assault by a habitual offender based on his previous convic-
tions for domestic abuse in Native American tribal court.1 The United 
States District Court for the District of North Dakota dismissed the ha-
bitual offender charge because Cavanaugh’s tribal court convictions 
were obtained without the benefit of the right to counsel.2 Unlike U.S. 
federal and state courts, tribal courts are not governed by the Constitu-
tion and therefore are not required to provide counsel for indigent de-
fendants like Cavanaugh.3 The district court reasoned that using Cava-
naugh’s uncounseled tribal court convictions to prove an element of an 
offense in federal court violated the Sixth Amendment because it “im-
pos[ed] federal punishment . . . based upon the uncounseled convic-
tion.”4 
 The government appealed, and the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that Cavanaugh’s un-
counseled tribal court convictions could be used against him in federal 
court.5 As a matter of first impression, the Eighth Circuit held that such 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2011–2012). 
1 United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 593 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 80 
U.S.L.W. 3478 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-7379). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 595–96. 
4 Id. at 595. 
5 Id. at 594, 605. 
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convictions may be used to prove the predicate conviction component 
of the federal habitual offender offense.6 In reaching this conclusion, 
the court recognized that its holding was distinguishable from the 
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Ant, which held that an uncounseled 
tribal court guilty plea could not be used to prove the underlying facts 
of a federal charge.7 Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit held that using 
tribal court convictions in this way was constitutional.8 In so doing, the 
Eighth Circuit gave little weight to the reliability concerns implicated 
when a conviction is obtained in the absence of counsel.9 
I. Cavanaugh’s Uncounseled Convictions and Appeal 
 On or about July 7, 2008, Cavanaugh assaulted his common-law 
wife, Amanda L. Luedtke.10 At the time of the assault, Cavanaugh was 
driving Luedtke and multiple children, and Cavanaugh and Luedtke 
were both intoxicated.11 The couple got into a fight, and Cavanaugh 
slammed Luedtke’s head into the dashboard of the car.12 After Cava-
naugh threatened to kill Luedtke, she jumped out of the car and hid.13 
The police subsequently arrested Cavanaugh and charged him with 
domestic assault by a habitual offender.14 
 One of the elements of a domestic assault by a habitual offender is 
that the offender has been convicted “on at least 2 separate prior occa-
sions in Federal, State, or Indian tribal court proceedings” for “assault, 
sexual abuse, or serious violent felony against a spouse or intimate 
partner . . . .”15 Cavanaugh is a member of the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe 
and was convicted of three misdemeanor domestic abuse offenses in 
the Spirit Lake Tribal Court prior to the July 2008 incident.16 Although 
                                                                                                                      
6 See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 593, 605. 
7 Id. at 604; United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1395 (9th Cir. 1989). 
8 See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 604–05. 
9 See id. 
10 United States v. Cavanaugh, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1065 (D.N.D. 2009), rev'd, 643 
F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3478 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-7379). 
11 United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 80 
U.S.L.W. 3478 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-7379). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 593–94. Cavanaugh was charged pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 117. Id. 
15 18 U.S.C. § 117 (2006). There are two other elements for the offense of a domestic 
assault by a habitual offender: (1) a domestic assault as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 117(b); and 
(2) committed “within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States 
or Indian country . . . .” Id. 
16 Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 594. 
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Cavanaugh was indigent, he did not have the right to court-appointed 
counsel to defend himself against those charges.17 
 The Constitution’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not al-
ways apply to Indian tribal courts because Indian tribes are quasi-
sovereign entities.18 Although the Indian Civil Rights Act extends some 
constitutional protections “to situations where an Indian tribe is the 
governmental actor,” it does not require tribal courts to provide counsel 
for indigent criminal defendants unless the prosecution results in a 
term of imprisonment greater than one year.19 Therefore, unless tribal 
law specifically provides for the right to counsel, indigent defendants 
who are sentenced to a term of incarceration of less than one year have 
neither a Constitutional nor a statutory basis for exercising this right.20 
As Cavanaugh was sentenced to less than one year in prison and did not 
have a right to counsel under the Spirit Lake Nation Law and Order 
Code, he did not have the right to court-appointed counsel.21 
 The district court determined that using uncounseled tribal court 
convictions to prove an element of a federal crime is unconstitutional 
because it violates a defendant’s due process rights and right to coun-
sel.22 While the court acknowledged that the Constitution does not ap-
ply to tribal courts, the district court reasoned that the use of uncoun-
seled convictions to prove an element of a crime in a federal court 
where the Constitution does apply is a Sixth Amendment violation.23 
The court based its conclusion on issues of fairness and equality, stating 
that “[a]s it stands now, American Indians are the only group of defen-
dants that could face conviction under [this habitual offender statute] 
as a result of underlying convictions for which they had no right to 
court-appointed counsel.”24 Accordingly, the district court granted 
Cavanaugh’s motion to dismiss the indictment.25 
 The government appealed to the Eighth Circuit, emphasizing that 
Cavanaugh’s convictions were valid because they complied with the In-
dian Civil Rights Act and the Constitution and could therefore be used 
                                                                                                                      
17 Id.; Cavanaugh, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1074. 
18 See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 595–96. 
19 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a)(6), (b), (c)(2) (2010); Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 596. 
20 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a)(6), (b), (c)(2) (2010); Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 596. 
21 See Cavanaugh, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1074. 
22 Id. at 1076. 
23 See id. at 1073, 1076–77. 
24 Id. at 1077. 
25 Id. 
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in federal court.26 In contrast, Cavanaugh argued that his prior tribal 
court convictions should not be used to establish the habitual offender 
elements of the statute because they would have been invalid if ob-
tained in a state or federal court where the Sixth Amendment applies.27 
 The Eighth Circuit reviewed the Supreme Court’s treatment of the 
right to counsel to determine whether using uncounseled convictions 
to establish elements of a federal offense violates the Sixth Amend-
ment.28 The court noted that although the 1963 Supreme Court case 
Gideon v. Wainwright held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
applies against the states, that right does not always preclude prior un-
counseled convictions from being used against a party.29 Rather, it is 
only the presence of a constitutional violation in the underlying pro-
ceeding that should determine whether a prior conviction may be used 
in a subsequent proceeding.30  
 In reaching this conclusion, the Eighth Circuit deemphasized the 
concern in Gideon about the unreliability of convictions obtained in the 
absence of counsel.31 The Gideon Court warned that without counsel, 
though a defendant “‘be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction 
because he does not know how to establish his innocence.’”32 The 
Eighth Circuit in Cavanaugh nonetheless determined that the presence 
of an actual constitutional violation in the underlying proceeding was 
more important than the reliability concerns expressed in Gideon.33 
 The Eighth Circuit ultimately concluded that Cavanaugh’s un-
counseled tribal court convictions could be used to establish elements 
of the federal habitual offender offense.34 The court reasoned that the 
subsequent use of Cavanaugh’s tribal court convictions in federal court 
was constitutional because the convictions were obtained in compliance 
                                                                                                                      
26 See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 596; Reply Brief for the United States at 2, United States 
v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1154), 2010 WL 2157020. 
27Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 596. Cavanaugh also argued on appeal that: (1) the tribal court 
convictions were “invalid from their inception” because he did not have the right to counsel; 
and (2) the habitual offender statute “singles out Indians because of their race,” thus violat-
ing the right to equal protection inherent in the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 595, 605. 
28 Id. at 597–603. 
29 Id. at 597, 602 (citing Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 67 (1980) (holding prior 
uncounseled felony conviction could be used for later federal conviction)); see Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). 
30 See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 601. 
31 Id. at 604; see Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345. 
32 372 U.S. at 345 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)). 
33 Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 604. 
34 See id. at 605. 
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with the tribal court’s requirements.35 It was irrelevant that the convic-
tions “would have been invalid had [they] arisen from a state or federal 
court” because they did not arise in state or federal court.36 The court 
emphasized that the Sixth Amendment is not implicated in tribal court, 
and therefore state and federal courts may subsequently use uncoun-
seled tribal court convictions without violating the Sixth Amendment.37 
II. Conflicting Applications of the Sixth Amendment in 
Cavanaugh and Ant 
 The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Cavanaugh conflicts with the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Ant.38 In Ant, the Ninth Circuit held that an un-
counseled tribal court guilty plea could not be used to prove the facts of 
a subsequent federal manslaughter charge.39 The court decided that the 
plea should have been suppressed because it would have violated the 
Sixth Amendment had it been entered in federal court.40 In contrast, 
the Eighth Circuit in Cavanaugh held that tribal proceedings need not 
comply with the same constitutional requirements as those in federal 
court in order to be used to establish elements of a subsequent federal 
offense.41 
 The contentious issue between the courts in Cavanaugh and Ant is 
not whether the uncounseled tribal court proceedings were valid at in-
ception; both courts agree that the respective proceedings were valid in 
tribal court because they were obtained in compliance with the Indian 
Civil Rights Act and tribal law.42 Rather, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits 
diverge on the issue of whether these tribal court proceedings can be 
used in federal or state court to establish an element of a federal of-
fense.43 The Eighth Circuit decided that an uncounseled conviction 
could be used to establish an element of a federal offense, while the 
Ninth Circuit determined that an uncounseled guilty plea could not.44 
The key difference was that the Cavanaugh court analyzed the constitu-
                                                                                                                      
35 Id. at 603–04. 
36 See id. at 604. 
37 See id. at 595–96, 603–05. 
38 See United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 604 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 80 
U.S.L.W. 3478 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-7379); United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 
1395 (9th Cir. 1989). 
39 882 F.2d at 1395. 
40 Id. at 1396. 
41 See 643 F.3d at 605. 
42 Id. at 595–96; Ant, 882 F.2d at 1392. 
43 See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 605; Ant, 882 F.2d at 1396. 
44 Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 605; Ant, 882 F.2d at 1396. 
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tionality of the uncounseled tribal proceeding according to tribal court 
standards while the Ant court analyzed the uncounseled proceeding 
according to federal court standards.45 
 In Cavanaugh, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the decisive ques-
tion in determining whether an uncounseled tribal conviction may be 
used in a subsequent federal proceeding is whether there is a constitu-
tional violation in the underlying conviction.46 The court found that the 
presence of a constitutional violation should be emphasized in lieu of 
the Supreme Court’s concern in Gideon about the convictions’ reliability 
in the absence of counsel.47 The court relied primarily on Nichols v. Unit-
ed States in which the Supreme Court held that an uncounseled convic-
tion that did not result in imprisonment could be used to enhance the 
punishment for a federal drug offense.48 The Nichols Court reasoned 
that the uncounseled conviction could be used because it was obtained 
in the absence of a constitutional violation.49 Nichols did not have the 
right to counsel during the proceedings because the Constitution only 
guarantees that right when the defendant is sentenced to a term of im-
prisonment.50 The Eighth Circuit relied on the fact that the Nichols 
Court did not explicitly mention Gideon reliability concerns and instead 
chose to focus on the constitutionality of the underlying proceeding.51 
 In applying this logic to Cavanaugh’s case, the Eighth Circuit 
stressed that Cavanaugh’s convictions did not involve a constitutional 
violation in the underlying tribal court proceeding.52 The court rea-
soned that it could not “preclude use of [a] prior conviction merely 
because it would have been invalid had it arisen from a state or federal 
court.”53 Cavanaugh’s convictions were valid because they were ob-
tained in tribal court, not federal or state court where such a lack of 
court-appointed counsel may well have been a constitutional viola-
                                                                                                                      
45 See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 604; Ant, 882 F.2d at 1396. 
46 643 F.3d at 601, 604. 
47 See id. at 604. 
48 See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748–49 (1994); Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 
599–600. 
49 See 511 U.S. at 748–49. 
50 See id.; Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (holding that “the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments . . . require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance 
of appointed counsel in his defense.”). 
51 See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 600; see also Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748–49 (focusing on the 
constitutionality of the underlying proceedings in its decision rather than reliability con-
cerns). 
52 See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 603–04. 
53 Id. at 604. 
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tion.54 The presence or absence of a constitutional violation, the court 
furthered, should be emphasized in lieu of concerns about the convic-
tions’ reliability in the absence of counsel.55 The court recognized the 
difficulty in comparing Nichols, where there was no sentence of impris-
onment, to Cavanaugh, where the uncounseled convictions led to im-
prisonment.56 Ultimately, however, the court held that Cavanaugh’s 
prior, uncounseled tribal court convictions could be used to establish 
elements of the federal habitual offender offense.57 
 In Ant, the Ninth Circuit held the opposite—that the use of an un-
counseled tribal court proceeding in a subsequent federal case is un-
constitutional.58 The court decided that Ant’s uncounseled tribal court 
guilty plea could not be used in a federal manslaughter charge because 
it did not satisfy the constitutional requirements for use in federal 
court.59 The Ninth Circuit based its holding on the notion that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is implicated “at ‘critical’ stages in a 
criminal prosecution where ‘substantial rights of a criminal accused 
may be affected.’”60 In Ant’s case, the court added that the need for 
counsel during the arraignment was especially critical because Ant was 
sentenced to prison after pleading guilty and his freedom was at 
stake.61 
 In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit in Ant considered 
whether the tribal proceedings would have been infirm had they taken 
place in federal court rather than whether the proceedings were valid at 
inception in tribal court.62 The court recognized that Ant’s tribal court 
guilty plea was valid at inception because the Sixth Amendment does 
not apply in tribal court.63 However, the court decided that the plea was 
inadmissible for use in federal court because the Sixth Amendment ap-
proceedings must be afforded the same constitutional protections as 
                                                                                                                     
plied at the “critical stage” of Ant’s arraignment.64 
 The Ninth Circuit essentially decided that when uncounseled pro-
ceedings are used for prosecutorial purposes in federal court, those 
 
54 See id. at 597, 603–05. 
55 See id. at 604. 
56 See id. at 601–03. 
57 See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 605. 
58 See 882 F.2d at 1396. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 1393 (quoting Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967)). 
61 See id. at 1393–94. 
62 See id. at 1393–95. 
63 See Ant, 882 F.2d at 1396. 
64 See id. at 1393–94, 1396. 
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they would have had if they had initially taken place in federal court.65 
This position is at odds with the Eighth Circuit opinion in Cavanaugh, 
which held that tribal court proceedings can be used to establish ele-
ments of a subsequent federal offense so long as they are not in viola-
tion of the Constitution at the time tried.66 In order to reconcile these di-
vergent holdings, the Eighth Circuit distinguished Ant on two grounds: 
in Ant, (1) the tribal and federal cases arose out of the same alleged in-
cident; and (2) the government used the tribal court proceedings to 
prove the truth of what was asserted in a guilty plea, rather than the fact 
of a prior conviction.67 The Eighth Circuit did not elaborate as to why 
those distinctions make a difference in determining whether an un-
counseled tribal court proceeding is admissible in federal court.68  
 The dissent in Cavanaugh questioned the majority’s attempt to dis-
tinguish itself from Ant.69 The crucial point in both cases, according to 
the dissent, is that they “involve[d] the use of the prior proceeding to 
prove an element of a subsequent federal offense.”70 So too did the ma-
jority recognize a possible weakness in its argument, stating that “rea-
sonable decision-makers may differ in their conclusions as to whether 
the Sixth Amendment precludes a federal court’s subsequent use of 
convictions that are valid because and only because they arose in a 
court where the Sixth Amendment did not apply.”71 
III. Considering the Reliability of Uncounseled Convictions 
 The Eighth Circuit recognized two important considerations in 
determining the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel: (1) 
the presence of a constitutional violation in the underlying proceeding; 
and (2) reliability concerns of a resulting conviction in the absence of 
court-appointed counsel.72 Ultimately, however, the Eighth Circuit in 
Cavanaugh determined that a consideration of constitutional violations, 
not reliability concerns, is the controlling consideration in deciding 
whether a prior conviction may be used in a subsequent proceeding.73 
                                                                                                                      
65 See id. at 1396. 
66 See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 605; Ant, 882 F.2d at 1396. 
67 See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 604. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 607 (Bye, J., dissenting). 
70 Id. 
71 See id. at 605. 
72 United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 604 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 80 
U.S.L.W. 3478 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-7379). 
73 See id. 
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The court specifically analyzed whether there was a constitutional viola-
tion in the forum in which the underlying proceeding took place.74 In 
so doing, the court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ant, 
which found that the infirmity of a prior proceeding should be deter-
mined by evaluating whether the proceeding satisfied the Constitu-
tional requirements for use in federal court.75 Unlike the Ninth Circuit 
in Ant, the Eighth Circuit in Cavanaugh did not consider whether the 
proceeding “would have been in violation of the Sixth Amendment had 
it been made in federal court” because, quite simply, Cavanaugh’s con-
victions did not arise in federal court.76 Although the Eighth Circuit’s 
approach sufficiently addresses the Supreme Court’s concerns about 
the constitutionality of the underlying conviction in Gideon, it does not 
fully answer the Gideon Court’s worry about the potential unreliability 
of uncounseled convictions.77 
 The Supreme Court in Gideon expressed concern about the unre-
liability of uncounseled convictions, noting that a defendant “requires 
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings.”78 The 
Court deemed the right to counsel as fundamental and essential to a 
fair trial.79 Although the Gideon Court recognized a fundamental right 
to counsel, this right does not always apply to tribal courts.80 This issue 
is further complicated when an uncounseled tribal court conviction is 
used to enhance or establish a federal offense in federal court where 
defendants have a right to counsel.81 Whether these convictions are 
considered a violation of the Sixth Amendment when they are used in 
federal court to establish a federal offense is uncertain and varies by 
circuit.82 Although the Eighth Circuit determined that it was constitu-
tional to use Cavanaugh’s uncounseled tribal court convictions, the 
court failed to adequately address one of the bases upon which the 
right to counsel was founded—the potential for unreliability in an un-
counseled conviction.83 
                                                                                                                      
74 See id. at 603–05. 
75 See id. at 604–05; United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989). 
76 Ant, 882 F.2d at 1396; see Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 604. 
77 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. at 45, 68–69 (1932)); Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 599–601, 604. 
78 372 U.S. at 345 (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 68–69). 
79 See id. at 343–44. 
80 See id.; Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 595–96. 
81 See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 593–94; Ant, 882 F.2d at 1396. 
82 See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 604–05; Ant, 882 F.2d at 1396; see also United States v. Sha-
vanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 998 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation when 
uncounseled tribal court convictions were used in subsequent federal prosecution). 
83 See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 600, 604. 
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 The Eighth Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court relied 
heavily on reliability concerns when deciding Gideon.84 Nevertheless, 
the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court mostly abandoned 
this line of reasoning in Nichols “because the Nichols majority made no 
express reference to reliability concerns,” and “a separate concurrence 
by Justice Souter discussing such concerns garnered no support from 
any of the other Justices.”85 Eight years after deciding Nichols, however, 
the Supreme Court again referenced reliability concerns in Alabama v. 
Shelton.86 The Eighth Circuit downplayed the Supreme Court’s reitera-
tion of this concern, stating that “[a]lthough Shelton emphasized reli-
ability concerns, it also emphasized the presence of an actual Sixth 
Amendment violation.”87 In spite of the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Shelton may suggest that both constitution-
ality and reliability should be considered in determining the use of un-
counseled convictions—a proposition for which the Cavanaugh court 
does not fully account.88 
Conclusion 
 The divergence between the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Cava-
naugh and the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Ant is based on a dis-
agreement about whether courts should analyze the constitutionality of 
the tribal court proceedings or the federal court proceedings. In Cava-
naugh, the Eighth Circuit chose the former approach and allowed the 
use of Cavanaugh’s uncounseled tribal court convictions in federal 
court. The Eighth Circuit’s decision was based primarily on whether 
the prior conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution, and 
not on whether the uncounseled convictions were reliable. As the Su-
preme Court has suggested that both constitutionality and reliability 
should be carefully considered when deciding cases involving uncoun-
seled convictions, the Eighth Circuit’s Sixth Amendment analysis is ar-
guably incomplete. 
 
84 See id. at 597, 600. 
85 Id. at 600. 
86 See id.; Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 667 (2002). 
87 Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 601. 
88 See Shelton, 535 U.S. at 667; Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 600–01, 604. 
